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Abstract—The principal goal of Group Testing (GT) is to iden-
tify a small subset of “defective” items from a large population,
by grouping items into as few test pools as possible. The test
outcome of a pool is positive if it contains at least one defective
item, and is negative otherwise. GT algorithms are utilized in
numerous applications, and in many of them maintaining the
privacy of the tested items, namely, keeping secret whether they
are defective or not, is critical.
In this paper, we consider a scenario where there is an
eavesdropper (Eve) who is able to observe a subset of the
GT outcomes (pools). We propose a new non-adaptive Secure
Group Testing (SGT) algorithm based on information-theoretic
principles, which keeps the eavesdropper ignorant regarding the
items’ status. Specifically, when the fraction of tests observed by
Eve is 0 ≤ δ < 1, we prove that the number of tests required
for both correct reconstruction at the legitimate user (with high
probability) and negligible information leakage to Eve is 1
1−δ
times the number of tests required with no secrecy constraint
for fixed K regime. By a matching converse, we completely
characterize the Secure GT capacity. Moreover, we consider a
computationally efficient decoding algorithm, and prove that for
δ < 1/2 the number of tests required, without any constraint on
K, is at most 1
1/2−δ times the number of tests required with no
secrecy constraint.
I. INTRODUCTION
The classical version of Group Testing (GT) was suggested
during World War II in order to identify syphilis-infected
draftees while dramatically reducing the number of required
tests [1]. Specifically, when the number of infected draftees,
K, is much smaller than the population size, N , instead of
examining each blood sample individually, one can conduct
a small number of of pooled samples. Each pool outcome is
negative if it contains no infected sample, and positive if it
contains at least one infected sample. The problem is thus
to identify the infected draftees via as few pooled tests as
possible. Figure 1 (a)-(c) depicts a small example.
Since its exploitation in WWII, GT has been utilized in
numerous fields, including biology and chemistry [2], [3],
communications [4]–[7], sensor networks [8], pattern matching
[9] and web services [10]. GT has also found applications
in the emerging field of Cyber Security, e.g., detection of
significant changes in network traffic [11], Denial of Service
attacks [12] and indexing information for data forensics [13].
Many scenarios which utilize GT involve sensitive infor-
mation which should not be revealed if some of the tests
leak (for instance, if one of the several labs to which tests
have been distributed for parallel processing is compromised).
However, in GT, leakage of even a single pool-test outcome
may reveal significant information about the tested items. If
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the test outcome is negative it indicates that none of the
items in the pool is defective; if it is positive, at least one
of the items in the pool is defective (see Figure 1 (d) for
a short example). Accordingly, it is critical to ensure that a
leakage of a fraction of the pool-tests outcomes to undesirable
or malicious eavesdroppers does not give them any useful
information on the status of the items. It is very important
to note that protecting GT is different from protecting the
communication between the parties. To protect GT, one should
make sure that information about the status of individual
items is not revealed if a fraction of the test outcomes leaks.
However, in GT, we do not want to assume one entity has
access to all pool-tests, and can apply some encoding function
before they are exposed. We also do not want to assume a
mixer can add a certain substance that will prevent a third
party from testing the sample. To protect GT, one should make
sure that without altering mixed samples, if a fraction of them
leaks, either already tested or not, information is not revealed.
While the current literature includes several works on the
privacy in GT algorithms for digital objects [13]–[16], these
works are based on cryptographic schemes, assume the testing
matrix is not known to all parties, impose a high computational
burden, and, last but not least, assume the computational
power of the eavesdropper is limited [17], [18]. Information
theoretic security considered for secure communication [18],
[19], on the other hand, if applied appropriately to GT, can
offer privacy at the price of additional tests, without keys,
obfuscation or assumptions on limited power. Due to the
analogy between channel coding and group-testing regardless
of security constraints, [20], [21], in Section II we present an
extensive survey of the literature on secure communication as
well.
Main Contribution
In this work, we formally define Secure Group Testing
(SGT), suggest SGT algorithms based on information-theoretic
principles and analyse their performance. In the considered
model, there is an eavesdropper Eve who might observe part
of the vector of pool-tests outcomes. The goal of the test
designer is to design the tests in a manner such that a legitimate
decoder can decode the status of the items (whether the items
are defective or not) with an arbitrarily small error probability.
It should also be the case that as long as Eve the eavesdropper
gains only part of the output vector (a fraction δ - a bound on
the value of δ is known a priori to the test designer, but which
specific items are observed is not), Eve cannot (asymptotically,
as the number of items being tested grows without bound) gain
any significant information on the status of any of the items.
We propose a SGT code and corresponding decoding algo-
rithms which ensure high of reliability (with high probability
over the test design, the legitimate decoder should be able to
estimate the status of each item correctly), as well as strong
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Figure 1: Classical group testing: An example of test results, a
simple decoding procedure at the legitimate decoder and the
risk of leakage. The example includes 7 items, out of which at
most one defective (the second one in this case; unknown to the
decoder). Three pooled tests are conducted. Each row dictates
in which pooled tests the corresponding item participates. (a)
Since the first result is negative, items 1 and 6 are not defective.
(b) The second result is positive, hence at least one of items
2 and 4 is defective. (c) Based on the last result, as item
4 cannot be defective, it is clear that 2 is defective. Note
that decoding in this case is simple: any algorithm which
will simply rule out each item whose row in the matrix is
not compatible with the result will rule out all but the second
item, due to the first and last test results being negative, thus
identifying the defective item easily. (d) An eavesdropper who
has access to part of the results (the first two) can still infer
useful information. Our goal is construct a testing matrix such
that such an eavesdropper remains ignorant.
secrecy conditions (as formally defined in Section III) - which
ensures that essentially no information about the status of
individual items leaks to Eve.
Our first SGT code and corresponding decoding algorithm
(based on Maximum Likelihood (ML) decoding) requires a
number of tests that is essentially information-theoretically
optimal in N, K and δ (as demonstrated in Section VI by
corresponding information-theoretic converse that we also
show for the problem).
The second code and corresponding decoding algorithm,
while requiring a constant factor larger number of tests than
is information-theoretically necessary (by a factor that is a
function of δ), is computationally efficient. It maintains the
reliability and secrecy guarantees, yet requires only O(N2T )
decoding time, where T is the number of tests.
We do so by proposing a model, which is, in a sense,
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Figure 2: An analogy between a wiretap erasure channel and
the corresponding SGT model.
analogous to a wiretap channel model, as depicted in Figure 2.
In this analogy the subset of defective items (unknown a priori
to all parties) takes the place of a confidential message. The
testing matrix (representing the design of the pools - each
row corresponds to the tests participated in by an item, and
each column corresponds to a potential test) is a succinct
representation of the encoder’s codebook. Rows or disjunctive
unions of rows of this testing matrix can be considered as
codewords. The decoding algorithm is analogous to a channel
decoding process, and the eavesdropped signal is the output
of an erasure channel, namely, having only any part of the
transmitted signal from the legitimate source to the legitimate
receiver.
In classical non-adaptive group-testing, each row of the
testing matrix comprises of a length-T binary vector which
determines which pool-tests the item is tested in. In the SGT
code constructions proposed in this work, each item instead
corresponds to a vector chosen uniformly at random from a
pre-specified set of random and independent vectors. Namely,
we use stochastic encoding, and each vector corresponds to
different sets of pool-tests an item may participate in. For each
item the lab picks one of the vectors in its set (we term the
set associated with item j as “Bin j”) uniformly at random,
and the item participates in the pool-tests according to this
randomly chosen vector. The set (“Bin”) is known a priori to
all parties, but the specific vector chosen by the encoder/mixer
is only known to the encoder/mixer, and hence is not a shared
key/common randomness in any sense. A schematic description
of our procedure is depicted in Figure 4.
Accordingly, by obtaining a pool-test result, without know-
ing the specific vectors chosen by the lab for each item, the
eavesdropper may gain only negligible information regarding
the items themselves. Specifically, we show that by careful
design of the testing procedure, even though the pool-tests
in which each item participated are chosen randomly and
even though the legitimate user does not know a-priori in
which pool-tests each item has participated, the legitimate
user will, with high probability over the testing procedure, be
able to correctly identify the set of defective items, while the
eavesdropper, observing only a subset of the pool-test results,
will have no significant information regarding the status of the
items.
The structure of this work is as follows. In Section II,
we present an extensive survey and summarize the related
work. In Section III, a SGT model is formally described.
Section IV includes our main results, with the direct proved
in Section V and converse proved in Section VI. Section VII
3describes a computationally efficient algorithm, and proves an
upper bound on its error probability. Section VIII concludes
the paper.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
A. Group-testing
Group-testing comes in various flavours, and the literature
on these is vast. At the risk of leaving out much, we reference
here just some of the models that have been considered in the
literature, and specify our focus in this work.
1) Performance Bounds: GT can be non-adaptive, where
the testing matrix is designed beforehand, adaptive, where
each new test can be designed while taking into account
previous test results, or a combination of the two, where
testing is adaptive, yet with batches of non-adaptive tests. It
is also important to distinguish between exact recovery and a
vanishing probability of error.
To date, the best known lower bound on the number of
tests required (non-adaptive, exact recovery) is Ω( K
2
logK logN)
[22]. The best known explicit constructions were given in
[23], resulting in O(K2 logN). However, focusing on exact
recovery requires more tests, and forces a combinatorial nature
on the problem. Settling for high probability reconstructions
allows one to reduce the number of tests to the order of
K logN .1 For example, see the channel-coding analogy given
in [20]. A similar analogy to wiretap channels will be at
the basis of this work as well. In fact, probabilistic methods
with an error probability guarantee appeared in [24], with-
out explicitly mentioning GT, yet showed the O(K logN)
bound. Additional probabilistic methods can be found in [25]
for support recovery, or in [26], when an interesting phase
transition phenomenon was observed, yielding tight results on
the threshold (in terms of the number of tests) between the
error probability approaching one or vanishing.
2) A Channel Coding Interpretation: As mentioned, the
analogy to channel coding has proved useful [20]. [21] defined
the notion of group testing capacity, that is, the value of
limN→∞
log (NK)
T under which reliable algorithms exist, yet,
over which, no reliable reconstruction is possible. A converse
result for the Bernoulli, non-adaptive case was given in [27].
Strong converse results were given in [28], [29], again, build-
ing on the channel coding analogy, as well as converses for
noisy GT [30]. In [31], adaptive GT was analyzed as a channel
coding with feedback problem.
3) Efficient Algorithms: A wide variety of techniques were
used to design efficient GT decoders. Results and surveys
for early non-adaptive decoding algorithms were given in
[32]–[34]. Moreover, although most of the works described
above mainly targeted fundamental limits, some give efficient
algorithms as well. In the context of this work, it is important
to mention the recent COMP [35], DD and SCOMP [36]
algorithms, concepts from which we will use herein.
1A simple information theoretic argument explains a lower bound. There
are K defectives out of N items, hence
(N
K
)
possibilities to cover: log
(N
K
)
bits of information. Since each test carries at most one bit, this is the amount
of tests required. Stirling’s approximation easily shows that for K  N , the
leading factor of that is K log(N/K).
B. Secure communication
It is very important to note that making GT secure is
different from making communication secure, as remarked in
Section I. Now, we briefly survey the literature in secure
communication, since many of the ideas/models/primitives in
secure communication will have analogues in secure group-
testing.
1) Information-theoretic secrecy: In a secure communica-
tion setting, transmitter Alice wishes to send a message m
to receiver Bob. To do so, she is allowed to encode m into
a (potentially random) function x = f(m), and transmit x
over a medium. It is desired that the eavesdropper Eve should
glean no information about m from its (potentially noisy)
observation z. This information leakage is typically measured
via the mutual information between m and z. The receiver Bob
should be able to reconstruct m based on its (also potentially
noisy) observation of x (and, potentially, a shared secret that
both Bob and Alice know, but Eve is ignorant of).
There are a variety of schemes in the literature
for information-theoretically secure communications.2 Such
schemes typically make one of several assumptions (or com-
binations of these):
• Shared secrets/Common randomness/Symmetric-key en-
cryption: The first scheme guaranteed to provide
information-theoretic secrecy was by [37], who analyzed
the secrecy of one-time pad schemes and showed that they
ensure perfect secrecy (no leakage of transmitted mes-
sage). He also provided lower bounds on the size of this
shared key. The primary disadvantage of such schemes is
that they require a shared key that is essentially as large
as the amount of information to be conveyed, and it be
continually refreshed for each new communication. These
requirements typically make such schemes untenable in
practice.
• Wiretap secrecy/Physical-layer secrecy: Wyner et al. [19],
[38] first considered certain communication models in
which the communication channel from Alice to Eve is
a degraded (noisier) version of the channel from Alice to
Bob, and derived the information-theoretic capacity for
communication in such settings. These results have been
generalized in a variety of directions. See [18], [39], [40]
for (relatively) recent results. The primary disadvantage
of such schemes is that they require that it be possible to
instantiate communication channels from Alice to Bob
that are better than the communication channel from
Alice to Eve. Further, they require that the channel
parameters of both channels be relatively well known
to Alice and Bob, since the choice of communication
rate depends on these parameters. These assumptions
make such schemes also untenable in practice, since on
one hand Eve may deliberately situate herself to have
2Security in general has many connotations for instance, in the information-
theory literature it can also mean a scheme that is resilient to an active
adversary, for instance a communication scheme that is resilient to jamming
against a malicious jammer. In this work we focus our attention on passive
eavesdropping adversaries, and aim to ensure secrecy of communications vis-
a-vis such adversaries. We shall thus henceforth use the terms security and
secrecy interchangeably.
4a relatively clear view of Alice’s transmission than Bob,
and on the other hand there are often no clear physically-
motivated reasons for Alice and Bob to know the channel
parameters of the channel to Eve.
• Public discussion/Public feedback: A very nice result by
Maurer ( [41] and subsequent work - see [18] for details)
significantly alleviated at least one of the charges level
against physical-layer security systems, that they required
the channel to Bob to be “better” than the channel to
Eve. Maurer demonstrated that feedback (even public
feedback that is noiselessly observable by Eve) and multi-
round communication schemes can allow for information-
theoretically secure communication from Alice to Bob
even if the channel from Alice to Bob is worse than
the channel from Alice to Eve. Nonetheless, such public
discussion schemes still require some level of knowledge
of the channel parameters of the channel to Eve.
2) Cryptographic security: Due to the shortcomings high-
lighted above, modern communication systems usually back
off from demanding information-theoretic security, and instead
attempt to instantiate computational security. In these settings,
instead of demanding small information leakage to arbitrary
eavesdroppers, one instead assumes bounds on the computa-
tional power of the eavesdropper (for instance, that it cannot
computationally efficiently invert “one-way functions”). Under
such assumptions one is then often able to provide conditional
security, for instance with a public-key infrastructure [42],
[43]. Such schemes have their own challenges to instantiate.
For one, the computational assumptions they rely on are
sometimes unfounded and hence sometimes turn out to be
prone to attack [17], [18], [44]. For another, the computational
burden of implementing cryptographic primitives with strong
guarantees can be somewhat high for Alice and Bob [45].
C. Secure Group-Testing
On the face of it, the connection between secure commu-
nication and secure group-testing is perhaps not obvious. We
highlight below scenarios that make these connections explicit.
Paralleling the classification of secure communication schemes
above, one can also conceive of a corresponding classification
of secure GT schemes.
1) Information-theoretic schemes:
• Shared secrets/Common randomness/Symmetric-key en-
cryption: A possible scheme to achieve secure group
testing, is to utilize a shared key between Alice and
Bob. For example, consider a scenario in which Alice
the nurse has a large number of blood samples that need
to be tested for the presence of a disease. She sends
them to a lab named Eve to be tested. To minimize the
number of tests done via the lab, she pools blood samples
appropriately. However, while the lab itself will perform
the tests honestly, it can’t be trusted to keep medical
records secure, and so Alice keeps secret the identity of
the people tested in each pool. 3
3Even in this setting, it can be seen that the number of diseased individuals
can still be inferred by Eve. However, this is assumed to be a publicly
known/estimable parameter.
Given the test outcomes, doctor Bob now desires to iden-
tify the set of diseased people. To be able to reconstruct
this mapping, a relatively large amount of information
(the mapping between individuals’ identities and pools
tested) needs to be securely communicated from Alice
to Bob. As in the one-time pad secure communication
setting, this need for a large amount of common ran-
domness makes such schemes unattractive in practice.
Nonetheless, the question is theoretically interesting, and
some interesting results have been recently reported in
this direction by [13]–[16].
• Wiretap secrecy/Physical-layer secrecy: This is the set-
ting of this paper. Alice does not desire to communicate
a large shared key to Bob, and still wishes to maintain
secrecy of the identities of the diseased people from “hon-
est but curious” Eve. Alice therefore does the following
two things: (i) For some δ ∈ (0, 1), she chooses a 1/δ
number of independent labs, and divides the T pools
to be tested into 1/δ pool sets of Tδ pools each, and
sends each set to a distinct lab. (ii) For each blood pool,
she publicly reveals to all parties (Bob, Eve, and anyone
else who’s interested) a set S(t) of possible combinations
of individuals whose blood could constitute that specific
pool t. As to which specific combination from S(t) of
individuals the pool actually comprises of, only Alice
knows a priori - Alice generates this private randomness
by herself, and does not leak it to anyone (perhaps by
destroying all trace of it from her records). The twin-fold
goal is now for Alice to choose pool-sets and set of S(t)
for each t ∈ [T ] to ensure that as long as no more than
one lab leaks information, there is sufficient randomness
in the set of S(t) so that essentially no information about
the diseased individuals identities leaks, but Bob (who
has access to the test reports from all the 1/δ labs)
can still accurately estimate (using the publicly available
information on S(t) for each test t) the disease status
of each individual. This scenario closely parallels the
scenario in Wyner’s Wiretap channel. Specifically, this
corresponds to Alice communicating a sequence of T
test outcomes to Bob, whereas Eve can see only a δ
fraction of test outcomes. To ensure secrecy, Alice injects
private randomness (corresponding to which set from
S(t) corresponds to the combination of individuals that
was tested in test t) into each test - this is the analogue
of the coding schemes often used for Wyner’s wiretap
channels.
Remark 1. It is a natural theoretical question to consider
corresponding generalizations of this scenario with other
types of broadcast channels from Alice to Bob/Eve (not
just degraded erasure channels), especially since such
problems are well-understood in a wiretap security con-
text. However, the physical motivation of such general-
izations is not as clear as in the scenario outlined above.
So, even though in principle the schemes we present
in Section III can be generalized to other broadcast
channels, to keep the presentation in this paper clean we
do not pursue these generalizations here.
5Remark 2. Note that there are other mechanisms via
which Alice could use her private randomness. For in-
stance, she could deliberately contaminate some fraction
of the tests she sends to each lab with blood from diseased
individuals. Doing so might reduce the amount of private
randomness required to instantiate secrecy. While this is
an intriguing direction for future work, we do not pursue
such ideas here.
• Public discussion/Public feedback: The analogue of a
public discussion communication scheme in the secure
group-testing context is perhaps a setting in which Al-
ice sends blood pools to labs in multiple rounds, also
known as adaptive group testing in the GT literature.
Bob, on observing the set of test outcomes in round i,
then publicly broadcasts (to Alice, Eve, and any other
interested parties) some (possibly randomized) function
of his observations thus far. This has several poten-
tial advantages. Firstly, adaptive group-testing schemes
(e.g. [36]) significantly outperform the best-known non-
adaptive group-testing schemes (in terms of smaller num-
ber of tests required to identify diseased individuals) in
regimes where K = ω(N1/3). One can hope for similar
gains here. Secondly, as in secure communication with
public discussion, one can hope that multi-round GT
schemes would enable information-theoretic secrecy even
in situations where Eve may potentially have access to
more test outcomes than Bob. Finally, such schemes may
offer storage/computational complexity advantages over
non-adaptive GT schemes. Hence this is an ongoing area
of research, but outside the scope of this paper.
2) Cryptographic secrecy: As in the context of secure
communication, the use of cryptographic primitives to keep
information about the items being tested secure has also
been explored in sparse recovery problems - see, for instance
[13]–[16]. Schemes based on cryptographic primitives have
similar weaknesses in the secure GT context as they do in the
communication context, and we do not explore them here.
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
In SGT, a legitimate user desires to identify a small un-
known subset K of defective items from a larger set N , while
minimizing the number of measurements T and keeping the
eavesdropper, which is able to observe a subset of the tests
results, ignorant regarding the status of the N items. Let
N = |N |, K = |K| denote the total number of items, and the
number of defective items, respectively. As formally defined
below, the legitimate user should (with high probability) be
able to correctly estimate the set K; on the other hand, from
the eavesdroppers perspective, this set should be “almost”
uniformly distributed over all possible
(
N
K
)
sets. We assume
that the number K of defective items in K is known a priori to
all parties - this is a common assumption in the GT literature
[3].4
4If this is not the case, [46], [47] give methods/bounds on how to “probably
approximately” correctly learn the value of K in a single stage with O(logN)
tests.
Throughout the paper, we use boldface to denote matrices,
capital letters to denote random variables, lower case letters
to denote their realizations, and calligraphic letters to denote
the alphabet. Logarithms are in base 2 and hb(·) denotes the
binary entropy function.
Figure 3 gives a graphical representation of the model. In
general, and regardless of security constraints, non-adaptive
GT is defined by a testing matrix
X = [XT1 ;X
T
2 ; . . . ;X
T
N ] ∈ {0, 1}N×T ,
where each row corresponds to a separate item j ∈
{1, . . . , N}, and each column corresponds to a separate pool
test t ∈ {1, . . . , T}. For the j-th item,
XTj = {Xj(1), . . . , Xj(T )}
is a binary row vector, with the t-th entry Xj(t) = 1 if and
only if item j participates in the t-th test. If Aj ∈ {0, 1}
denotes an indicator function for the j-th item, determining
whether it belongs to the defective set, i.e., Aj = 1 if j ∈
K and Aj = 0 otherwise, the (binary) outcome of the t ∈
{1, . . . , T} pool test Y (t) equals
Y (t) =
N∨
j=1
Xj(t)Aj =
∨
d∈K
Xd(t),
where
∨
is used to denote the boolean OR operation.
In SGT, we assume an eavesdropper who observes a noisy
vector ZT = {Z(1), . . . , Z(T )}, generated from the outcome
vector Y T . In the erasure case considered in the work, the
probability of erasure is 1 − δ, i.i.d. for each test. That is,
on average, Tδ outcomes are not erased and are accessible
to the eavesdropper via ZT . Therefore, in the erasure case,
if Bt ∈ {1, ?} is an erasure indicator function for the t-th
pool test, i.e., Bt = 1 with probability δ, and Bt =? with
probability 1− δ, the eavesdropper observes
Z(t) = Y (t)Bt =
 N∨
j=1
Xj(t)Aj
Bt, t = 1, . . . , T.
Denote by W ∈ W , {1, . . . , (NK)} the index of the subset
of defective items. We assume W is uniformly distributed, that
is, there is no a priori bias towards any specific subset.5 Fur-
ther, denote by Wˆ (Y T ) the index recovered by the legitimate
decoder, after observing Y T . In this work, we assume that
the mixer may use a randomized testing matrix. In this case,
the random bits used are know only to the mixer, and are
not assumed to be shared with the decoder. In other words,
the “codebook” which consists of all possible testing matrices
is known to all parties, Alice, Bob and Eve. However, if the
mixer choose a specific X, the random value is not shared
with Bob or Eve. We refer to the codebook consisting of all
5This is a common probabilistic model for the set of defectives in group-
testing. Another model, called Probabilistic Group Testing, assumes that items
are defective with probability K/N . Yet another model assumes that any set
of size at most K (rather than exactly K) instantiates with equal probability.
In many group-testing scenarios results for one probabilistic model for the
set of defectives can be translated over to other scenarios, so we focus on the
model presented above, where exactly K items are defective.
6Figure 3: Noiseless non-adaptive secure group-testing setup.
possible matrices, together with the decoder at Bob’s side as
SGT algorithm.
As we are interested in the asymptotic behavior, i.e., in
“capacity style” results, with a focus on the number of tests
T (as a function of N and K) required to guarantee high
probability of recovery as the number of items N grows
without bound. For simplicity, in the first part of this work,
we focus primarily on the regime where K is a constant
independent of N . In Section VII, we give an algorithm which
applies to any K.6 The following definition lays out the goals
of SGT algorithms.
Definition 1. A sequence of SGT algorithms with parameters
N,K and T is asymptotically (in N) reliable and weakly or
strongly secure if,
(1) Reliable: The probability (over the index W ) of incorrect
reconstruction of W at the legitimate receiver converges to
zero. That is,
lim
N→∞
P (Wˆ (Y T ) 6= W ) = 0.
(2) Weakly secure: One potential security goal is so-called
weak information-theoretic security against eavesdropping.
Specifically, if the eavesdropper observes ZT , a scheme is
said to be weakly secure if
lim
T→∞
1
T
I(W ;ZT ) = 0.
(3) Strongly secure: A stronger notion of security is so-called
strong information-theoretic security against eavesdropping.
Specifically, if the eavesdropper observes ZT , a scheme is
said to be strongly secure if
lim
T→∞
I(W ;ZT ) = 0.
Remark 3. Note that strong security implies that in the limit
the distribution over ZT is essentially statistically independent
of the distribution over W . Specifically, the KL divergence
between pZT ,W and pZT pW converges to 0.
Remark 4. While weak security is a much weaker notation of
security against eavesdropping than strong security, and indeed
is implied by strong security, nonetheless we consider it in this
work for the following reason. Our impossibility result will
show that even guaranteeing weak security requires at least a
6Following the lead of [27], in principle, many of our results in this section
as well can be extended to the regime where K = o(N1/3), but for ease of
presentation we do not do so here).
certain number of tests, and our achievability results will show
that essentially the same number of tests suffices to guarantee
strong security. Hence both our impossibility and achievability
results are with regard to the corresponding “harder to prove”
notion of security.
To conclude, the goal in this work is to design (for pa-
rameters N and K) an N × T measurement matrix (which
is possibly randomized) and a decoding algorithm W (Y T ),
such that on observing Y T , the legitimate decoder can (with
high probability over W ) identify the subset of defective items,
and yet, on observing ZT , the eavesdropper learns essentially
nothing about the set of defective items.
IV. MAIN RESULTS
Under the model definition given in Section III, our main
results are the following sufficiency (direct) and necessity
(converse) conditions, characterizing the maximal number of
tests required to guarantee both reliability and security. The
proofs are deferred to Section V and Section VI.
A. Direct (Sufficiency)
The sufficiency part is given by the following theorem.
Theorem 1. Assume a SGT model with N items, out of which
K = O(1) are defective. For any 0 ≤ δ < 1, if
T ≥ max
i=1,...,K
1 + ε
1− δ
K
i
log
(
N −K
i
)
, (1)
for some ε>0 independent of N and K, then there exists a
sequence of SGT algorithms which are reliable and secure.
That is, as N → ∞, both the average error probability ap-
proaches zero exponentially and an eavesdropper with leakage
probability δ is kept ignorant.
The construction of the SGT algorithm, together with the
proofs of reliability and secrecy are deferred to Section V. In
fact, in Section V we actually prove that the maximal error
probability decays to 0. However, a few important remarks are
in order now.
First, rearranging terms in eq. (1), we have
T ≥ 1
1− δ maxi=1,...,K
(1 + ε)K
i
log
(
N −K
i
)
.
That is, compared to only a reliability constraint, the number
of tests required for both reliability and secrecy is increased
by the multiplicative factor 11−δ , where, again, δ is the leakage
probability at the eavesdropper.
7The result given in Theorem 1 uses an ML decoding at the
legitimate receiver. The complexity burden in ML, however,
prohibits the use of this result for large N. In Theorem 3,
we suggest an efficient decoding algorithm, which maintains
the reliability and the secrecy results using a much simpler
decoding rule, at the price of only slightly more tests.
Using an upper bound on log
(
N−K
i
)
, the maximization in
Theorem 1 can be solved easily, leading to simple bound on
T with tight scaling and only a moderate constant.
Corollary 1. For SGT with parameters K << N and T ,
reliability and secrecy can be maintained if
T ≥ 1 + ε
1− δK log(N −K)e.
Proof. Substituting log
(
N−K
i
) ≤ i log (N−K)ei , the maximum
over i is easily solved.
Note that together with the converse below, this suggests
T = Θ
(
K logN
1−δ
)
, and, a Θ (K logN) result for δ bounded
away from 1.
B. Converse (Necessity)
The necessity part is given by the following theorem.
Theorem 2. Let T be the minimum number of tests necessary
to identify a defective set of cardinality K among population
of size N while keeping an eavesdropper, with a leakage
probability δ < 1, ignorant regarding the status of the items.
Then, if 1T I(W ;Z
T ) < , one must have:
T ≥ 1− T
1− δ log
(
N
K
)
,
where T = + ˜T , with ˜T → 0 as T →∞.
The lower bound is derived using Fano’s inequality to
address reliability, assuming a negligible mutual information at
the eavesdropper, thus keeping an eavesdropper with leakage
probability δ ignorant, and information inequalities bounding
the rate of the message on the one hand, and the data Eve does
not see on the other. Compared with the lower bound without
security constraints, it is increased by the multiplicative factor
1
1−δ .
C. Secrecy capacity in SGT
Returning to the analogy in [21] between channel capacity
and group testing, one might define by Cs the (asymptotic)
minimal threshold value for log
(
N
K
)
/T , above which no
reliable and secure scheme is possible. Under this definition,
the result in this paper show that Cs = (1− δ)C, where C is
the capacity without the security constraint. Clearly, this can
be written as
Cs = C − δC,
raising the usual interpretation as the difference between the
capacity to the legitimate decoder and that to the eavesdropper
[18]. Note that as the effective number of tests Eve sees is
Te = δT , her GT capacity is δC.
D. Efficient Algorithms
Under the SGT model definition given in Section III, we
further consider a computationally efficient algorithm at the
legitimate decoder. Specifically, we analyze the Definite Non-
Defective (DND) algorithm (originally called Combinatorial
Orthogonal Matching Pursuit (COMP)), considered for the
non-secure GT model in the literature [35], [36]. The theorem
below states that indeed efficient decoding (with arbitrarily
small error probability) and secrecy are possible, at the price
of a higher T . Interestingly, the theorem applies to any K,
and not necessarily only to K = O(1). This is, on top of
the reduced complexity, an important benefit of the suggested
algorithm.
Theorem 3. Assume a SGT model with N items, out of which
K are defective. Then, for any δ < 12
(
1− ln 2K
)
, there exists an
efficient decoding algorithm, requiring O(N2T ) operations,
such that if the number of tests satisfies
T ≥ 1 + 
1
2 (1− ln 2K )− δ
K logN
its error probability is upper bounded by
Pe ≤ N−.
The construction of the DND GT algorithm, together with
the proofs of reliability and secrecy are deferred to Section VII.
Clearly, the benefits of the algorithm above come at the price
of additional tests and a smaller range of δ it can handle.
V. CODE CONSTRUCTION AND A PROOF FOR THEOREM 1
In order to keep the eavesdropper, which obtains only a
fraction δ of the outcomes, ignorant regarding the status of the
items, we randomly map the items to the tests. Specifically,
as depicted in Figure 4, for each item we generate a bin,
containing several rows. The number of such rows corresponds
to the number of tests that the eavesdropper can obtain, yet,
unlike wiretap channels, it is not identical to Eve’s capacity,
and should be normalized by the number of defective items.
Then, for the j-th item, we randomly select a row from the
j-th bin. This row will determine in which tests the item will
participate.
In order to rigorously describe the construction of the
matrices and bins, determine the exact values of the parameters
(e.g., bin size), and analyze the reliability and secrecy, we
first briefly review the representation of the GT problem as a
channel coding problem [20], together with the components
required for SGT.
A SGT code consists of an index set W = {1, 2, . . . (NK)},
its w-th item corresponding to the w-th subset K ⊂
{1, . . . , N}; A discrete memoryless source of randomness
(R, pR), with known alphabet R and known statistics pR; An
encoder,
f :W ×R→ XSw ∈ {0, 1}K×T
which maps the index W of the defective items to a matrix
XTSw of codewords, each of its rows corresponding to a dif-
ferent item in the index set Sw, w ∈ W , |Sw| = K. The need
for a stochastic encoder is similar to most encoders ensuring
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Figure 4: Binning and encoding process for a SGT code.
information theoretic security, as randomness is required to
confuse the eavesdropper about the actual information [18].
Hence, we define by RK the random variable encompassing
the randomness required for the K defective items, and by M
the number of rows in each bin. Clearly, MK = H(RK).
At this point, an important clarification is in order. The lab,
of course, does not know which items are defective. Thus,
operationally, it needs to select a row for each item. However,
in the analysis, since only the defective items affect the output
(that is, only their rows are ORed together to give Y T ), we
refer to the “message” as the index of the defective set w
and refer only to the random variable RK required to choose
the rows in their bins. In other words, unlike the analogous
communication problem, in GT, nature performs the actual
mapping from W to XTSw . The mixer only mixes the blood
samples according to the (random in this case) testing matrix
it has.
A decoder at the legitimate user is a map
Wˆ : YT →W.
The probability of error is P (Wˆ (Y T ) 6= W ). The probability
that an outcome test leaks to the eavesdropper is δ. We assume
a memoryless model, i.e., each outcome Y (t) depends only
on the corresponding input XSw(t), and the eavesdropper
observes Z(t), generated from Y (t) according to
p(Y T , ZT |XSw) =
T∏
t=1
p(Y (t)|XSw(t))p(Z(t)|Y (t)).
We may now turn to the detailed construction and analysis.
1) Codebook Generation: Choose M such that
log2(M) = T (δ − ′)/(K)
for some ′ > 0. ′ will affect the equivocation. Using a
distribution P (XT ) =
∏T
i=1 P (xi), for each item generate
M independent and identically distributed codewords xT (m),
1 ≤ m ≤M . The codebook is depicted in the left hand side of
Figure 4. Reveal the codebook to Alice and Bob. We assume
Eve may have the codebook as well.
2) Testing: For each item j, the mixer/lab selects uniformly
at random one codeword xT (m) from the j-th bin. Therefore,
the SGT matrix contains N randomly selected codewords of
length T , one for each item, defective or not. Amongst is an
unknown subset XTSw , with the index w representing the true
defective items. An entry of the j-th random codeword is 1
if the j-item is a member of the designated pool test and 0
otherwise.
3) Decoding at the Legitimate Receiver: The decoder looks
for a collection of K codewords XTSwˆ , one from each bin, for
which Y T is most likely. Namely,
P (Y T |XTSwˆ) > P (Y T |XTSw),∀w 6= wˆ.
Then, the legitimate user (Bob) declares Wˆ (Y T ) as the set of
bins in which the rows wˆ reside.
A. Reliability
Let (S1,S2) denote a partition of the defective set S into
disjoint sets S1 and S2, with cardinalities i and K− i, respec-
tively.7 Let I(XS1 ;XS2 , Y ) denote the mutual information
between XS1 and XS2 , Y , under the i.i.d. distribution with
which the codebook was generated and remembering that Y
is the output of a Boolean channel. The following lemma is a
key step in proving the reliability of the decoding algorithm.
Lemma 1. If the number of tests satisfies
T ≥ (1 + ε) · max
i=1,...,K
log
(
N−K
i
)
M i
I(XS1 ;XS2 , Y )
,
then, under the codebook above, as N →∞ the average error
probability approaches zero.
Next, we prove Lemma 1, which extends the results in [20]
to the codebook required for SGT. Specifically, to obtain a
bound on the required number of tests as given in Lemma 1,
we first state Lemma 2, which bounds the error probability of
the ML decoder using a Gallager-type bound [48].
Definition 2. The probability of error event Ei in the ML
decoder defined, as the event of mistaking the true set for a
set which differs from it in exactly i items.
Lemma 2. The error probability P (Ei) is bounded by
P (Ei) ≤ 2
−T
(
Eo(ρ)−ρ
log (N−Ki )Mi
T −
log (Ki )
T −KT
)
,
where the error exponent Eo(ρ) is given by
Eo(ρ) = − log
∑
Y ∈{0,1}
∑
XS2∈{0,1}
[ ∑
XS1∈{0,1}
P (XS1)
p(Y,XS2 |XS1)
1
1+ρ
]1+ρ
, 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1.
7This partition helps decompose the error events into classes, where in
class i one already knows K − i defective items, and the dominant error
event corresponds to missing the other i. Thus, it is easier to present the error
event as one “codeword” against another. See Appendix A for the details.
9In Appendix A we analyze the bound provided in Lemma 2.
Note that there are two main differences compared to non-
secured GT. First, the decoder has
(
N
K
)
MK possible subsets
of codewords to choose from,
(
N
K
)
for the number of possible
bins and MK for the number of possible rows to take in each
bin. Thus, when fixing the error event, there are
(
N−K
i
)
M i
subsets to confuse the decoder. Moreover, due to the bin
structure of the code, there are also many “wrong” codewords
which are not the one transmitted on the channel, hence create
a decoding error codeword-wise, yet the actual bin decoded
may still be the right one.
Proof of Lemma 1. For this lemma, we follow the derivation
in [20]. However, due the different code construction, the
details are different. Specially, for each item there is a bin
of codewords, from which the decoder has to choose. Define
f(ρ) = Eo(ρ)− ρ
log
(
N−K
i
)
M i
T
− log
(
K
i
)
T
−K
T
.
We wish to show that T f(ρ) → ∞ as N → ∞. Note
that log
(
K
i
)
is a constant for the fixed K regime. Thus
for large T we have limT→∞ f(0) = 0. Since the function
f(ρ) is differentiable and has a power series expansion, for
a sufficiently small α, by Taylor series expansion in the
neighborhood of ρ ∈ [0, α] we have
f(ρ) = f(0) + ρ
df
dρ
|ρ=0 +Θ(ρ2).
Now,
∂Eo
∂ρ
|ρ=0
=
∑
Y
∑
XS2
[
∑
XS1
P (XS1)p(Y,XS2 |XS1) log p(Y,XS2 |XS1)
−
∑
XS1
P (XS1)p(Y,XS2 |XS1)
∑
XS1
P (XS1)p(Y,XS2 |XS1)]
=
∑
Y
∑
XS2
∑
XS1
P (XS1)p(Y,XS2 |XS1)
log
p(Y,XS2 |XS1)∑
XS1
P (XS1)p(Y,XS2 |XS1) = I(XS
1 ;XS2 , Y ).
Hence, if
(1 + ε)
log
(
N−K
i
)
M i
T
< I(XS1 ;XS2 , Y )
for some constant ε > 0, the exponent is positive for large
enough T and we have P (Ei) → 0 as T → ∞ for ρ > 0.
Using a union bound one can show that taking the maximum
over i will ensure a small error probability in total.
The expression I(XS1 ;XS2 , Y ) in Lemma 1 is critical to
understand how many tests are required, yet it is not a function
of the problem parameters in any straight forward mannar. We
now bound it to get a better handle on T .
Claim 1. For large K, and under a fixed input distribution
for the testing matrix ( ln(2)K , 1− ln(2)K ), the mutual information
between XS1 and (XS2 , Y ) is lower bounded by
I(XS1 ;XS2 , Y ) ≥ i
K
.
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Figure 5: Mutual Information Bound
Proof of Claim 1. First, note that
I(XS1 ;XS2 , Y )
(a)
= I(XS1 ;XS2) + I(XS1 ;Y |XS2)
= H(Y |XS2)−H(Y |XS)
(b)
= qK−iH(qi)
= qK−i
[
qi log
1
qi
+
(
1− qi) log 1
(1− qi)
]
,
where equality (a) follows since the rows of the testing
matrix are independent, and (b) follows since H(Y |XS) is
the uncertainty of the legitimate receiver given XS , thus
when observing the noiseless outcomes of all pool tests, this
uncertainty is zero. Also, note that the testing matrix is random
and i.i.d. with distribution (1− q, q), hence the probability for
i zeros is qi.
Then, under a fixed input distribution for the testing matrix
(p = ln(2)K , q = 1− ln(2)K ) and large K it is easy to verify that
the bounds meet at the two endpoint of i = 1 and i = K,
yet the mutual information is concave in i thus the bound is
obtained. This is demonstrated graphically in Figure 5.
Applying Claim 1 to the expression in Lemma 1, we have
log
(
N−K
i
)
M i
I(XS1 ;XS2 , Y )
≤ log
(
N−K
i
)
M i
i
K
.
Hence, substituting M = 2T
δ−K
K , a sufficient condition for
reliability is
T ≥ max
1≤i≤K
1 + ε
i
K
[
log
(
N −K
i
)
+
i
K
T (δ − K)
]
Rearranging terms results in
T ≥ max
1≤i≤K
1
1− δ + K − εδ + εK
1 + ε
i/K
log
(
N −K
i
)
,
where by reducing K and εK we increase the bound on T ,
and with some constant ε > 0. Noting that this is for large K
and N , and that ε is independent of them, achieves the bound
on T provided in Theorem 1 and reliability is established.
B. Information Leakage at the Eavesdropper
We now prove the security constraint is met. Hence, we
wish to show that I(W ;ZT )/T → 0, as T →∞. Denote by
10
CT the random codebook and by XTS the set of codewords
corresponding to the true defective items. We have,
1
T I(W ;Z
T |CT ) = 1T
(
I(W,RK ;Z
T |CT )− I(RK ;ZT |W, CT )
)
(a)
= 1T
(
I(XTS ;Z
T |CT )− I(RK ;ZT |W, CT )
)
= 1T (I(X
T
S ;Z
T |CT )−H(RK |W, CT ) +H(RK |ZT ,W, CT ))
(b)
= 1T
(
I(XTS ;Z
T |CT )−H(RK) +H(RK |ZT ,W, CT )
)
(c)
=I(XS ;Z|CT )− 1
T
K logM +
1
T
H(RK |ZT ,W, CT )
(d)
≤δ − 1
T
K
(
T
δ − ′
K
)
+
1
T
H(RK |ZT ,W, CT )
(e)
≤ T + ′,
where T → 0 as T → ∞. (a) is since there is a 1 : 1
correspondence between (W,RK) and XTS ; (b) is since RK
is independent of W and CT ; (c) is since in this direct
result the codebook is defined by the construction and is
memoryless, as well as the channel; (d) is since by choosing
an i.i.d. distribution for the codebook one easily observes that
I(XS ;Z|CT ) ≤ δ. Finally, (e) is for the following reason:
Given W and the codebook, Eve has a perfect knowledge
regarding the bins from which the codewords were selected.
It requires to see whether she can indeed estimate RK . Note
that the channel Eve sees in this case is the following multiple
access channel: each of the defective items can be considered
as a “user” with M messages to transmit. Eve’s goal is to
decode the messages from all users. This is possible if the
rates at which the users transmit are within the capacity region
of this MAC. Indeed, this is a (binary) Boolean MAC channel,
followed by a simple erasure channel. The sum capacity cannot
be larger than δ, and this sum capacity is easily achieved by
letting one user transmit at a time, or, in our case, where
the codebook is randomly i.i.d. distributed, under a fixed
input distribution p = 1 − 2 1K . Since actually, we use input
distribution for the testing matrix of ( ln(2)K , 1 − ln(2)K ), and
limK→∞ 1− 2 1K / ln(2)K = 1, for large K, each user obtain the
same capacity; namely, each user sees a capacity of δ/K.
Remark 5. Under non-secure GT, it is clear that simply
adding tests to a given GT code (increasing T ) can only
improve the performance of the code (in terms of reliability).
A legitimate decoder can always disregard the added tests. For
SGT, however, the situation is different. Simply adding tests to
a given code, while fixing the bin sizes, might make the vector
of results vulnerable to eavesdropping. In order to increase
reliability, one should, of course, increase T , but also increase
the bin sizes proportionally, so the secrecy result above will
still hold. This will be true for the efficient algorithm suggested
in Section VII as well.
Remark 6. To establish the weak secrecy constraint we set
M to be 2T
δ−′
K , where the readability is archived without
any constraint on ′. However, in Appendix B to establish the
strong secrecy constraint we require M to be 2T
δ+′
K .
Remark 7. Note that since
1
T
H(RK |ZT ,W, CT ) = 1
T
H(RK)− 1
T
I(RK ;Z
T ,W, CT )
=
1
T
logM − 1
T
I(RK ;Z
T ,W, CT ),
any finite-length approximation for I(RK ;ZT ,W, CT ) will
give a finite length approximation for the leakage at the
eavesdropper. For example, one can use the results in [49],
to show that the leakage can be approximated as 1√
T
+ ′.
VI. CONVERSE (NECESSITY)
In this section, we derive the necessity bound on the
required number of tests. Let Z¯ denote the random variable
corresponding to the tests which are not available to the
eavesdropper. Hence, Y = (Z, Z¯). By Fano’s inequality, if
Pe → 0, we have
H(W |Y ) ≤ T′T ,
where ′T → 0 as T → ∞. Moreover, the secrecy constraint
implies
I(W ;Z) ≤ T′′T , (2)
where ′′T → 0 as T →∞. Consequently,
log
(
N
K
)
= H(W )
= I(W ;Y ) +H(W |Y )
(a)
≤ I(W ;Z, Z¯) + T′T
= I(W ;Z) + I(W ; Z¯|Z) + T′T
(b)
≤ I(W ; Z¯|Z) + T′T + T′′T
(c)
≤ I(XSw ; Z¯|Z) + T (′T + ′′T )
= H(Z¯|Z)−H(Z¯|XSw , Z) + T (′T + ′′T )
(d)
≤ H(Z¯) + T (′T + ′′T )
where (a) follows from Fano’s inequality and since Y =
(Z, Z¯), (b) follows from (2), (c) follows from the Markov
chain W → XTSw → Y → Z and (d) is since conditioning
reduces entropy.
We now evaluate H(Z¯). Denote by E¯ the set of tests which
are not available to Eve and by E¯γ the event {|E¯| ≤ T (1 −
δ)(1 + γ)} for some γ > 0. We have
H(Z¯) = P (E¯γ)H(Z¯|E¯γ) + P (E¯cγ)H(Z¯|E¯cγ)
≤ T (1− δ)(1 + γ) + TP (E¯cγ)
≤ T (1− δ)(1 + γ) + T2−T (1−δ)f(γ),
where the last inequality follows from the Chernoff bound for
i.i.d. Bernoulli random variables with parameter (1 − δ) and
is true for some f(γ) such that f(γ) > 0 for any γ > 0.
Thus, we have
log
(
N
K
)
≤ T (1− δ)(1 + γ) + T2−T (1−δ)f(γ) + T (′T + ′′T ).
That is,
T ≥ 1− T
1− δ log
(
N
K
)
,
for some T such that T → 0 as T →∞. This completes the
converse proof.
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VII. EFFICIENT ALGORITHMS
The achievability result given in Theorem 1 uses a random
codebook and ML decoding at the legitimate party. The
complexity burden in ML, however, prohibits the use of this
result for large N . In this section, we derive and analyze an
efficient decoding algorithm, which maintains the reliability
result using a much simpler decoding rule, at the price of only
slightly more tests. The secrecy constraint, as will be clear,
is maintained by construction, as the codebook and mixing
process do not change compared to the achievability result
given before. Moreover, the result in this section will hold for
any K, including even the case were K grows linearly with
N .
Specifically, we assume the same codebook generation and
the testing procedure given in Section V, and analyze the
Definite Non-Defective (DND) algorithm, previously consid-
ered for the non-secure GT in the literature [35], [36]. The
decoding algorithm at the legitimate user is as follows. Bob
attempts to match the rows of X with the outcome vector Y T .
If a particular row j of X has the property that all locations t
where it has 1, also corresponds to a 1 in Y (t), then that row
can correspond to a defective item. If, however, the row has 1
at a location t where the output has 0, then it is not possible
that the row corresponds to a defective item. The problem,
however, when considering the code construction in this paper
for SGT, is that the decoder does not know which row from
each bin was selected for any given item. Thus, it takes a
conservative approach, and declares an item as defective if at
least one of the rows in its bin signals it may be so. An item
is not defective only if all the rows in its bin prevent it from
being so.
It is clear that this decoding procedure has no false neg-
atives, as a defective item will always be detected. It may
have, though, false positives. A false positive may occur if all
locations with ones in a row corresponding to a non-defective
item are hidden by the ones of other rows corresponding to
defective items and selected by the mixer. To calculate the
error probability, fix a row of X corresponding to a non-
defective item (a row in its bin). Let j1; . . . ; jk index the rows
of X corresponding to the K defective items, and selected by
the mixer for these items (that is, the rows which were actually
added by the Boolean channel). An error event associated with
the fixed row occurs if at any test where that row has a 1, at
least one of the entries Xj1(t), . . . , Xjk(t) also has a 1. The
probability for this to happen, per column, is p(1− (1−p)K).
Hence, the probability that a test result in a fixed row is hidden
from the decoder, in the sense that it cannot be declared as
non defective due to a specific column, is
p(1− (1− p)K) + (1− p) = 1− p(1− p)K .
Since this should happen for all T columns, the error proba-
bility for a fixed row is
(
1− p(1− p)K)T . Now, to compute
the error probability for the entire procedure we take a union
bound over all M(N − K) rows corresponding to non-
defective items. As a result, we have
Pe ≤ M(N −K)
(
1− p(1− p)K)T
(a)
≤ MN
(
1− y
K
(
1− y
K
)K)βK logN
= MN
(
1− y
K
(
1− y
K
)K−1 (
1− y
K
))βK logN
(b)
≤ MN
(1− y (1− yK )
Key
)Kβ logN
(c)
≤ MNe−y(1− yK )e−yβ logN
≤ MN1−y(1− yK )e−yβ 1ln 2
(d)
= MN1−
1
2β(1− ln 2K )
(e)
= 2β(δ−) logNN1−
1
2β(1− ln 2K )
= Nβ(δ−)N1−
1
2β(1− ln 2K )
≤ N1−β( 12 (1− ln 2K )−δ). (3)
In the above, (a) follows by taking p = y/K and setting T as
βK logN , for some positive y and β, to be defined. (b) follows
since e−y ≤ (1 − y/n)n−1 for small y > 0 and any integer
n > 0. In the sequence below, we will use it with y = ln 2, for
which it is true. (c) follows since e−x ≥ (1−x/n)n for x > 0
and any integer n > 0. (d) follows by choosing y = ln 2. (e)
is by setting M = 2T
δ−
K and substituting the value for T .
The result in (3) can be interpreted as follows. As long as
δ, the leakage probability at the eavesdropper, is smaller than
1
2 (1 − ln 2K ), choosing T = βK logN with a large enough
β results in an exponentially small error probability. For
example, for large enough K and δ = 0.25, one needs β > 4,
that is, about 4K logN tests to have an exponentially small
(with N ) error probability while using an efficient decoding
algorithm. To see the dependence of the error probability on
the number of tests, denote
 = β
(
1
2
(
1− ln 2
K
)
− δ
)
− 1.
Then, if the number of tests satisfies
T ≥ 1 + 
1
2 (1− ln 2K )− δ
K logN
one has
Pe ≤ N−.
Thus, while the results under ML decoding (Theorem 1) show
that any value of δ < 1 is possible (with a 11−δ toll on
T compared to non-secure GT), the analysis herein suggests
that using the efficient algorithm, one can have a small error
probability only for δ < 1/2, and the toll on T is greater
than 11
2−δ
. This is consistent with the fact that this algorithm
is known to achieve only half of the capacity for non-secure
GT [36]. However, both these results may be due to coarse
analysis, and not necessarily due to an inherent deficiency in
the algorithm.
Remark 8 (Complexity). It is easy to see that the algorithm
runs over all rows in the codebook, and compares each one
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Figure 6: Definite Non-Defective and ML simulation results.
to the vector of tests’ results. The length of each row is T .
There are N items, each having about 2
δ
K T rows in its bin.
Since T = O(K logN), we have O(N2) rows in total. Thus,
the number of operations is O(N2T ) = O(KN2 logN). This
should be compared to O(KN logN) without any secrecy
constraint.
Figure 6 includes simulation results of the secure DND
GT algorithm proposed, compared with ML decoding and the
upper and lower bounds on the performance of ML.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we proposed a novel non-adaptive SGT algo-
rithm, which with parameters N,K and T is asymptotically
reliable and secure. Specifically, when the fraction of tests
observed by Eve is 0 ≤ δ < 1, we prove that the number of
tests required for both correct reconstruction at the legitimate
user (with high probability) and negligible mutual information
at Eve’s side is 11−δ times the number of tests required
with no secrecy constraint. We further provide sufficiency
and necessity bounds on the number of tests required in
the SGT model to obtains both, reliability and secrecy con-
straints. Moreover, we analyze in the proposed secure model,
computationally efficient algorithms at the legitimate decoder,
previously considered for the non-secure GT in the literature
which identify the definitely non-defective items.
APPENDIX A
ERROR PROBABILITY BOUND
In this section, we give a direct proof for Lemma 1.
Specifically, we bound the error probability of the maximum
likelihood decoder, and show that under the condition on T
in the lemma, the error probability is indeed approaching 0 as
N →∞.
Under the assumption that all items are equality likely to
be defective, we consider the error probability given that the
first K items are defective, that is, Sw=1 is the defective set.
Denote this probability by Pe|1. We have
Pe|1 ≤
K∑
i=1
P (Ei),
where Ei is the event of a decoding error in which the decoder
declares a defective set which differs from the true one (S1)
in exactly i items. Note that the discussion below will apply
to any defective set Sw of size K, hence the probability of
error computed decays exponentially for any “message W ”.
In general, we follow the derivation in [20]. However, there
is a key difference. In the code construction suggested in
Section V, for each item there are M possible codewords (a
“bin” of size M ). Only one of these codewords is selected
by the mixer to decide in which pool tests the item will
participate. Thus, when viewing this problem as a channel
coding problem, if an item is defective, one and only one
codeword out of its bin is actually transmitted (and summed
with the codewords of the other K−1 defective items). Since
the decoder does not know which codewords were selected
in each bin (the randomness is known only to the mixer),
there are multiple error events to consider. E.g., events where
the decoder choose the wrong codeword for some items, yet
identified parts of the bins correctly, and, of course, events
where the codeword selected was from a wrong bin. This
complicates the error analysis significantly. Moreover, we wish
to employ the correction suggested in [50], which results in a
simpler yet stricter bound.
Consider the event Ei. Clearly, Ei can be broken down
into two disjoint events. The first is Ei and the event that
the codewords selected for the correct K − i items are the
true transmitted ones, and the second is the event of both
Ei and the event that at least one of the codewords selected
for the correct items is wrong. Denote the first event as E′i.
Now, consider the case where we have Ei, that is, a correct
decision on K − i items, yet, out of these K − i items, the
decoder identified only j codewords right, 0 ≤ j < K − i,
and for the rest, it identified a wrong codeword in the right
bin. We claim that the probability for this event is exactly
P (E′K−j), as the decoder has to mistake X
′ for XS1 , where
both are collections of K codewords, and X′ shares exactly j
codewords with XS1 . Thus, we have:
Pe|1 ≤
K∑
i=1
P (Ei)
=
K∑
i=1
(
P (E′i) +
K−i−1∑
j=0
(
K − i− 1
j
)
P (E′K−j)
)
≤ 2K
K∑
i=1
P (E′i). (4)
The last inequality in (4) is loose, yet it suffices for the proof
in the regime where K = O(1). A more delicate bounding
technique might be required if K might grow with N .
We now bound P (E′i). Particularly, we will establish the
following lemma.
Lemma 3. The error probability P (E′i) is bounded by
P (E′i) ≤ 2
−T
(
Eo(ρ)−ρ
log (N−Ki )Mi
T −
log (Ki )
T
)
,
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where the error exponent Eo(ρ) is given by
Eo(ρ) = − log
∑
Y ∈{0,1}
∑
XS2∈{0,1}
[ ∑
XS1∈{0,1}
P (XS1)
p(Y,XS2 |XS1)
1
1+ρ
]1+ρ
, 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1.
Proof. Denote by
A = {w ∈ W : |S1c,w| = i, |Sw| = K}
the set of indices corresponding to sets of K items that differ
from the true defective set S1 in exactly i items. S1c,w for
w ∈ W denotes the set of items which are in Sw but not in
S1.
We have
Pr[E′i|w0 = 1,XS1 , Y T ]
≤
∑
w∈A
∑
XS1c,w
Q(XS1c,w)
pw(Y
T ,XS1,w |XS1c,w )s
p1(Y
T ,XS1,w |XS1,wc )s
(5)
≤
∑
S1,w
∑
S1c,w
∑
XS1c,w
Q(XS1c,w)
pw(Y
T ,XS1,w |XS1c,w )s
p1(Y
T ,XS1,w |XS1,wc )s
,
where (5) is exactly [20, eq. (25)], as when considering E′i we
assume the decoder not only got K − i items right, but also
the correct codeword in each such bin. Hence
Pr[Ei|w0 = 1,XS1 , Y T ]
(a)
≤
(∑
S1,w
∑
S1c,w
∑
XS1c,w
Q(XS1c,w)
pw(Y
T ,XS1,w |XS1c,w )s
p1(Y
T ,XS1,w |XS1,wc )s
)ρ
(b)
≤
(∑
S1,w
(N−Ki )M
i
∑
XS1c,w
Q(XS1c,w)
pw(Y
T ,XS1,w |XS1c,w )s
p1(Y
T ,XS1,w |XS1,wc )s
)ρ
(c)
≤ (N−Ki )ρMiρ
∑
S1,w
( ∑
XS1c,w
Q(XS1c,w)
pw(Y
T ,XS1,w |XS1c,w )s
p1(Y
T ,XS1,w |XS1,wc )s
)ρ
for all s > 0 and 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1. Note that (a) is since the
probability is less than 1 and can be raised to the power of
ρ. (b) is critical. It follows from the symmetry of codebook
construction, namely, the inner summation depends only on
the codewords in XS1c,w but not the ones in S1c,w. Due to the
code’s construction, i.e., its binning structure, there are exactly(
N−K
i
)
M i possible sets of codewords to consider for S1c,w.
(c) follows as the sum of positive numbers raised to the ρ-th
power is smaller than the sum of the ρ-th powers.
We now continue similar to [20], substituting the condi-
tional error probability just derived in a summation over all
codewords and output vectors. We have
P (E′i) =
∑
XS1
∑
Y T
p1(XS1 , Y T ) Pr[E′i|w0 = 1,XS1 , Y T ]
≤ (N−Ki )ρMiρ
∑
S1,w
∑
Y T
∑
XS1
p1(XS1 ,Y
T )
 ∑
XS1c,w
Q(XS1c,w)
pw(Y
T ,XS1,w |XS1c,w)
s
p1(Y
T ,XS1,w |XS1,wc )s
ρ .
There are
(
K
K−i
)
sets S1,w, and the summation does not depend
on which set is it, hence, we get
P (E′i) ≤ (N−Ki )ρMiρ(Ki )
∑
Y T
∑
XS1
p1(XS1 ,Y
T )
 ∑
XS1c,w
Q(XS1c,w)
pw(Y
T ,XS1,w |XS1c,w )s
p1(Y
T ,XS1,w |XS1,wc )s
ρ
which continue similar to [20], results in
P (E′i) ≤ (N−Ki )ρMiρ(Ki )
[∑
Y
∑
XS1,w( ∑
XS1,wc
Q(XS1c,w)p
1/(1+ρ)
1 (XS1,w ,Y |XS1,wc )
)1+ρ]T
.
Thus, we have
P (E′i) ≤ 2
−T
(
E0(ρ)−ρ
(
log (N−Ki )
T +
i logM
T
)
− log (
K
i )
T
)
.
APPENDIX B
INFORMATION LEAKAGE AT THE EAVESDROPPER
(STRONG SECRECY)
We wish to show that I(W ;ZT ) → 0. Denote by CT
the random codebook and by XTSw the set of codewords
corresponding to the true defective items.
We assumed W ∈ {1, . . . , (NK)} is uniformly distributed,
that is, there is no a-priori bias to any specific subset. Further,
the codebook includes independent and identically distributed
codewords. The eavesdropper, observing ZT , wish to decode
the true K independent and identically distributed codewords,
which correspond to the defective items, one of
(
N
K
)
subsets.
To analyze the information leakage at the eavesdropper, we
note that the channel Eve sees in this case is the following
multiple access channel. Each of the items can be considered
as a “user” with M specific codewords. Eve’s goal is to
identify the active users. Note the Eve’s channel can be viewed
as (binary) Boolean MAC, followed by a BEC(1 − δ). The
sum capacity to Eve cannot be larger than δ. In fact, since
the codebook is randomly i.i.d. distributed, under a fixed
input distribution for the testing matrix ( ln(2)K , 1− ln(2)K ), Eve
can obtain from each active user a rate of at most δ/K.
Consequently, Eve may obtain a sub-matrix Z˜ of possibly
transmitted codewords, where from each codeword Eve sees
at most a capacity of δ/K.
However, in this analysis, we help Eve even further to get
the true sub-matrix Z˜, with the maximum rate δ/K. That is,
we assume Eve gets the full rate, identifies the codewords
of the users except for the erasures. We give Eve the power
not to be confused from the existence of other, N −K users
which did not transmit eventually. Providing this information
to Eve only makes her stronger and thus a coding scheme that
succeeds to keep Eve ignorant, will also succeed against the
original Eve.
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Figure 7: Codewords exactly lie in a ball around Z˜T
j˜
of radius
d ≈ (1− δK )T ), where j is the codeword index and 1 ≤ i ≤ N
is the bin index.
Now, once Eve obtains the true sub-matrix Z˜, since the
codebook and the subsets of the items was generated inde-
pendently and identically, we will analyze the information
that leaks at the eavesdropper from each possibly transmitted
codeword in Z˜ separately. Namely, per original codeword XTj ,
on average, δKT from the T outcomes are not erased and are
accessible to the eavesdropper via Z˜T
j˜
. Thus, out of the M
independent and identically distributed codewords, there is an
exponential number of codewords, that from eavesdropper per-
spective, may have participated in XTSw and could have resulted
in the same Z˜T
j˜
. These consistent codewords are exactly those
that lie in a ball around Z˜T
j˜
of radius d ≈ (1− δK )T as depicted
in Figure 7.
The eavesdropper does not know what is the codeword XTj
in XTSw , which was selected by the mixer and she even does
not know what dH = ‖XTj − Z˜Tj˜ ‖ is exactly (where ‖·‖ is the
hamming distance), other than the fact that dH ≈ (1− δK )T .
However, we help Eve by providing d and by choosing a
small yet exponential set of codewords (of size 2T

K , for
an appropriately small ) from the codebook C, chosen from
the set of all codewords at distance d from Z˜T
j˜
, with the
additional guarantee that it also contains the true XTj . We refer
to this set as the oracle-given set XTOracel. Again, providing
this information to Eve only makes her stronger and thus a
coding scheme that succeeds to keep Eve ignorant, will also
succeed against the original Eve.
Conditioned on Eves view Z˜T
j˜
and XTOracel, each of the
codewords in XTOracel is equally likely to have been partici-
pated in the pool tests. Nonetheless, Eve still has a reasonable
amount of uncertainty about which of the 2T

K codewords
was actually participated indeed, this is the uncertainty that
we leverage in our analysis. We define, for any Z˜T
j˜
and d, a
ball and a shell as
Vol(Z˜T
j˜
, d) = {XTj : dH(XTj , Z˜Tj˜ ) ≤ d},
Sh(Z˜T
j˜
, d) = {XTj : dH(XTj , Z˜Tj˜ ) = d}.
Hence, we define the probability for a codeword to fall in shell
as
Pr(XTj ∈ C ∩XTj ∈ Sh(Z˜Tj˜ , d))
=
Vol(Sh(Z˜T
j˜
, d))
2T
=
2(1−
δ
K )T
2T
.
For each item we have M = 2
(
δ+′
K
)
T codewords. Thus, on
average, the number of codewords Eve sees on a shell, per
defective item is
|{w : XTj (w) ∈ Sh(Z˜Tj˜ , d)}|
=
2
(
δ+′
K
)
T · 2(1− δK )T
2T
= 2T
′
K .
Hence, we can conclude that, on average, for every item, Eve
has quite a few options in a particular shell.
Now that we established that the average number of code-
words per item |{w : XTj (w) ∈ Sh(Z˜Tj˜ , d)}| is 2T
′
K , we wish
to calculate the probability that the actual number of options
deviates from the average by more than ε. We define
EC1(Z˜Tj˜ , d) := Pr{(1− ε)2T
′
K ≤
|{w : XTj (w) ∈ Sh(Z˜Tj˜ , d)}| ≤ (1 + ε)2T
′
K }.
Let us fix a pair Z˜T
j˜
and d for large enough T . By the Chernoff
bound, and taking union bound over Z˜T
j˜
and d, we have
Pr(EC1(Z˜Tj˜ , d)) ≥ 1− 2−ε
′2T
′
K .
Due to the super exponential decay in T , even when we take
a union bound over all the codewords and all shells, we get
that the probability that a codeword will have |{w : XTj (w) ∈
Sh(Z˜T
j˜
, d)}| options significantly different than 2T ′K is very
small. Actually, with high probability, Eve has almost the same
number of options per item. Hence, for Eve all the codewords
are almost equiprobable. In other words, Eve distribution on
the items converges super-exponentially fast to a uniform one,
hence H(W |ZT )→ H(W ) and we have I(W ;ZT )→ 0.
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